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ANNOTATION

The given collective monograph is project continuation "Virtual workshops in social studies" which has begun in the late nineties under the aegis of the Moscow Public Scientific Foundation (MPSF). During realization of the given project under the direction of Dr.sc.oec. Prof. R.M. Nureev it was generated problem- focused scientific network community of economists and sociologists from different cities of Russia, from Moscow to Biisk. This community was consolidated on the basis of problems studying of Post-Soviet Russia by means of institutional economy methods. Economists for this purpose participating in the project and sociologists have concentrated the attention to those "game rules" on which there lived Russians of 1990th. General idea on which basis that monograph was prepared, was an accurate understanding that even in Russia are created market economy bases, however in the country yet it was not possible to create effective national model of economy. Work on that monograph was the original form of summarizing of a "Yeltsin" epoch of development of Post-Soviet Russia. Two editions of the collective monograph "Economic agents of Post-Soviet Russia (institutional analysis)" (2001; 2003) became result of work of group of social scientists, and also articles in many leading Russian and foreign journals.

After the lapse of a decade the group of authors under the direction of R.M.Nureev in the updated structure offers readers the new review of "game rules" in Post-Soviet Russia – not "Yeltsin", but "Putin's" epoch. Then, 10 years ago, it seemed to the majority of members of a group of authors that Russia is in unstable, a transition state, between the Soviet last and market future, from here such paradoxical combinations of pro-market and anti-market institutes. However that seemed transitivity earlier, has appeared the Russian national model of a market economy. Russia yet has not found the effective system of "game rules" approaching for domestic civilization, but continues them to search. This book – the original report on these searches.

Collecting collective of authors of the monograph, editors were guided by following reasons:

- 1) authors should represent not only two capitals, but also other cities of Russia (up to Khabarovsk);
- 2) though among authors dominate economists, it is paid compliments participation of sociologists and other social scientists;
- 3) the most general methodological basis is the institutionalism (company development is considered as search of most effective "game rules").

Organizing the new collective monograph, editors selected texts of heads so that, on the one hand, to deepen analysis of those what have been mentioned for the first time still 10 years ago, and on the other hand, to show such important problems to which earlier participants of the project did not pay special attention.

The new book is divided into three blocks, devoted to institutional behavior of households (Ch. 1-6), firms (Ch. 7-11) and the states (Ch. 12-17) in Post-Soviet Russia 2000th

Book chapter 1 considers "**Adaptation of households to the market**" (P.V.Krjuchkova, I.V.Rozmainy). Here is noticed that Russian households though save many lines of "underdevelopment" (in particular, the sizes of middle class continue to wish the best), however nevertheless by degrees come nearer to the western type. In particular, "it is possible to say that for a significant amount of Russians base model of financial behavior was changed: from "lives on means" to "debt". Increase of modernization of Russian households was reflected and in increase of attention of Russians to human capital accumulation (education system development) – to long-term process with long payback time.

In the second chapter, "**Interpersonal and institutional trust as the social capital of modern Russia**" (Ju.V.Latov), is told about some features of Russian economic mentality. Object of studying became interpersonal and institutional trust as characteristics of the social capital of the nation. As a result of the analysis of databases of the Russian and international interrogations not trivial conclusion is done that on level of trust Russia – is enough average (on the world standards) country similar to Italy.

The third chapter of the new monograph, "**Ways of formation of the effective worker-partner**" (A.L.Temnitsky), is devoted a problem of increase of activity of the worker. Earlier researchers of labor behavior of Russians implicitly were guided by "the American" standard of the worker which actively changes places of employment in search of calling and the income. These expectations have not justified – the situation in modern Russia much more close to "the Japanese" standard (system of lifelong employment) when the worker categorically avoids to change a place of employment, aspiring to improve the position in times of the selected organization. The analysis is constructed as case-study – studying of

one of the machine-building enterprises of Moscow suburbs). Formation of the effective worker-partner is considered as very inconsistent process connected with growth of individual consciousness of workers which washes away old paternalistic installations.

In the fourth chapter "**Russian middle class as an economic agent: the characteristic and prospects**" is analyzed "the characteristic and prospects" (N.E.Tikhonov, S.V.Mareeva). The question on middle class formation in Russia is the central problem of Post-Soviet development. The middle class of Russia is enough numerous as all who at least partially approach under its definition, constitute half of Russians. But at the same time middle class of Russia is much smaller as the middle class nucleus includes only 10-15 % of citizens. The most interesting is that half of middle class are the people working in a state sector. Therefore Russian middle class has while very limited possibilities for transformation from "a class in itself" in "a class for itself". It means that the overwhelming majority of households still have no conditions of stable and dynamical development.

By the end of 2000th it becomes more and more distinct clearly that the corruption, one of main barriers of modernization of Russia, grows not only "from above", but also "from below". Certainly, in monetary measurement scales of household corruption are insignificant in comparison with the sizes of business corruption. However the stable tradition to "purchase" offsets, examinations and even diplomas about higher education are a mine of the slowed down action which can undermine any hopes of human capital growth. Results stated in the fifth chapter, "**University corruption and parallel market of educational services as obstacles to human capital accumulation**" (L.G.Miljaeva, E.O.Leonteva), two local researches – case-study in Biisk and Khabarovsk – show very fruitful possibilities of this new approach for understanding of institutional brakes of development of Russia.

The sixth chapter, "**Formation of institutes of civil society (on housing and communal services example)**" (A.V.Ermishina, L.V.Klimenko), contains a material simultaneously and very private (housing and communal services reforms), and very much the general (formation of civil company). On a private example of development of housing self-management in two cities of Southern federal district (in Rostov-on-Don and in Azov) authors show that to western community Russians should pass a distance of the huge size. The habit to vertical hierarchy blocks in modern Russia sprouts of civil company even at microlocal level where the mighty of this world is not inclined to interfere with their development. Russians continue to adapt to the market not market methods.

The seventh chapter, "**Evolution of Russian firm and corporate governance: in search of the effective proprietor**" (S.B.Avdasheva, T.G.Dolgopjatova), is direct continuation of researches of consequences of mass privatization of 1990th. Post termination "not so" effective "revolutionary" privatization of 1990th has begun "evolutionary" transformation of the property rights in Russian business. Authors of the head come to conclusions that changes of 2000th as a whole go towards growth of the specification of the property rights. In the beginning of 2000th in Russia there was "an economy of monopolies" (the highest concentration of the property) and "insiders economy" (property and management combination). By the end of 2000 these characteristics were not gone, but are appreciable weaken: the tendency to falling of level of concentration is observed, the role of foreign investors has increased and in general there is a drift towards division of functions of management and possession.

In the eighth chapter, "**Employment practice as an element of the social organization of Russian firm**" (A.G.Efendiev, E.S.Balabanov), proceeds the analysis of mutual relations of businessmen and the workers, begun in the third chapter. However if earlier labor relations were considered as result of a choice of wage and salary earners now they are considered as result of a choice of businessmen. There is an old tradition to contrast is patriarchal-bureaucratic ex-Soviet (let even privatized) the enterprises with the dynamical new business giving open space for the personal initiative and demonstration of professionalism. Results of research of authors of the given chapter resolutely break this stereotype. It appears, hiring on professional qualities prevails just at the Post-Soviet enterprises while in a new private sector hiring under the patronage prevails. So, reproduction of institutes of the power-property in 1990-2000th Occurred not only in households and in state structures, but also in firms.

The ninth chapter, "**New generation of businessmen and managers in a changing institutional environment**" (M.A.Shabanov), is devoted the characteristic of chiefs of a new private sector from the point of view of their readiness for the civilized business based on observance of business obligations, rules of law and morals. According to the data case-study, about third of representatives of business it is possible to consider "civilized" - in their images of business reputation fulfillment of business obligations is supported with observance morally-ethical or/and it is formal-rules of law (laws). Every sixth of new businessmen/heads has appeared "unpredictable" (on criminal slang such call "morons"), not appreciating neither the rights, nor morals, business obligations. Thus, among businessmen the share "civilized"

nevertheless essentially exceeds a share "completely not civilized" that inspires cautious optimism concerning prospects of development of Russian business.

The problem of interaction of firms with the state is considered in the tenth chapter – "**Network interrelations of Russian business: business corruption and institutional organizations of Russian economy**" (S.N.Levin, M.V.Kurbatov). Seven years ago it seemed that replacement of "dark blue roofs" (gangster-criminal) "red roofs" (state employees in a role private law-enforcers) is the intermediate stage of transition to normal system for the developed countries of legal enforcement. This forecast has not absolutely justified: "red roofs" in the end of 2000th do not prevail, but it on change "governor's roofs" have come normal for developing countries. It is a question of experts of large-scale shadow payments of businessmen to public agents. Modern Russian business, authors do a conclusion, remains "semi-independent" subordinated element to "an imperious vertical", constructed on domination of relations of the power-property.

The eleventh chapter considers "**Small business in Russian oligopolistic economy**" (T.V.Shvartsburd). In it again it is a question of social networks as to the environment of ability to live of Post-Soviet business. Social networks – natural (in Russia) an inhabitancy of small business. The author considers a modern small-scale business as continuation of that informal economy which not only in Soviet, but also in ante-Soviet period survived in absence of legal protection and access to the formal credit. Therefore weak (to measures of the developed countries) the small-scale business level of development in Post-Soviet Russia hides the high level of informal economy typical for the countries of catching up development with "the mercantilist state" a la H. de Soto.

Developing in the twelfth chapter "**Institutional approach to research of interaction of the government and business in modern Russia**" (M.J.Malkin, A.JU.Ivanov), authors notice that new ("Putin", replaced "Yeltsin") institutional environment for business and state interaction, is still characterized by domination of the power over the property. In Russia there was a conglomerate of a formal private property behind which real power-property with "the friable" a property right disappears. Old hopes of overcoming "institutional inadequacy" Russian state were replaced by understanding of that at historically developed system of mutual relations of the state and company the power will stand still for a long time above business.

Theme of the thirteenth chapter – "**Institutional corruption in Russia**" (S.J.Barsukova, V.V. Kolesnikov, JU.G.Naumov). Earlier corruption relations were considered (first of all, with reference to "a Yeltsin" epoch) basically in a context of "state buying up" - as the instrument of influence of business on the power. In modern Russia corruption has turned to the instrument of submission of business of the power, "business buying up" dominates. Therefore began quite lawful to consider business corruption as one of the basic functions of Russian state officers and politicians. Corruption became an organic element of political processes and, accordingly, one of key elements of system of the Post-Soviet power-property.

The fourteenth chapter, "**Evolution of institutes of political power of Russia**" (R.M.Nureev, S.G. Shulgin), develops a plot about voting cycle from the previous collective monograph. As it is found out, domestic regional leaders had some reliance of the future – but not at the expense of increase, and at the expense of fall of "transparency" of a political life. Elections become faster the formalized ritual, than real competition of politicians for trust of voters. Local "barons" - bureaucrats began to use manipulation of the data about an appearance of voters on elections as a signal of the loyalty to the federal centre. By the end of 2000 power became more autocratical and is less under control citizens, than it was a decade ago.

The fifteenth chapter, "**System of public finances of Russia: evolution of institutes**" (U.V.Malkina), shows interrelation between old and new paths budget system. The author shows a role of dependence on a predominating trajectory of development which leaves traces on modern institute. Here are analyzed stabilization funds as anti-recessionary institute of the state finance system of Russia. The special paragraph is devoted state by corporations that are original "state within a state". The detailed analysis of the state order shows that it yet did not become high-grade institute of the market, and till now saves State Logistics Committee birthmarks.

Innovative process and tax system of Russia became object of studying of the sixteenth chapter: "**System of public finances of Russia: evolution of institutes**" (A.V.Alexey). In it is established that changes to the best in structure of national economy and have not occurred: possibility of low tax load on business in a favorable raw conjuncture which could become a basis for scale modernization of its technological basis, has appeared is missed. The policy of the government in 2000 has appeared is directed without delay on preservation before the typed inertia, than on revolutionary changes in production.

In the final seventeenth chapter "**System of public finances of Russia: evolution of institutes**" (G.P.Litvintseva, O.V.Voronkova, E.A.Stukalenko) is considered. Though the government officially proclaims a rate on "the social state" in the social democratic version, actually given tendency is traced poorly enough. In the end of 2000th social policy is understood by the government as struggle, first of all, with poverty, but not with high differentiation of incomes. Irrespective of, how much such policy is successful, it essentially cannot remove social pressure and convince citizens that the market economy is capable to ensure "well-being for all".

Development trends of the Russian state in 2000 seem least (in comparison with development trends of households and firms) progressive, the most pessimistic. It is in the paradoxical image contradicts that axiomatic fact that "Putin" state is much stronger and respected by Russians, than "Yeltsin" state. A paradox solution, probably, that the political mode of 2000 maintains model habitual for Russians: the state rejects pressure of "intrigues" of external and internal enemies, guarantees the citizen calmness and well-being in exchange for unconditional loyalty. The slogan "will not be neither revolutions, nor counterrevolutions", the put forward V.V. Putin, reflects main ideologeme of "Putin's" epoch, and the political mode actually realizes this slogan. Unfortunately, authors of this slogan do not notice that develop purely evolutionary, avoiding revolutions, is possible only when the national social and economic model has shown the efficiency. Otherwise instead of evolution it is possible to receive for-stand. Russian state so while could not find the adequate mechanism for our country constant institutional self-updating.